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In their article entitled "On Extrajudicial Constitutional In-
terpretation,"1 Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer promise 
to provide an "unqualified" defense of the rule of judicial su-
premacy announced in Cooper v. Aaron.2 According to that 
rule, government officials must obey the Constitution as it has 
been interpreted by the Supreme Court, even when they disa-
gree with the Court's interpretation.3 They are not free to fol-
low their own judgment of what the Constitution requires. The 
Court has lately reaffirmed the rule of obedience, holding in 
City of Boerne v. Florel that Congress may not work substan-
tive changes in constitutional interpretation through Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. I do not propose to quarrel with 
the Court, or with Alexander's and Schauer's endorsement of 
Cooper v. Aaron. My point is that Alexander and Schauer have 
not gone far enough to accomplish what they would like to ac-
complish. In fact, their argument is qualified in a very important 
way. 
Alexander and Schauer base their defense of the rule of 
obedience to Supreme Court decisions on the "settlement func-
tion" of law. The primary object of law, in their view, is "to set-
tle authoritatively what is to be done" in contested situations, 
which in tum will promote social stability and enable individuals 
to coordinate their actions in mutually beneficial ways.5 The po-
tential benefits of settled law provide a "content-independent" 
reason why individuals should obey the law even when they 
• Professor of Law, University of San Diego. Thanks to Larry Alexander for 
comments. 
1. Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359 (1997) ("Alexander and Schauer"). 
2. 358 u.s. 1 (1958). 
3. Alexander and Schauer at 1359-63 (cited in note 1). 
4. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). 
5. Alexander and Schauer at 1371 (cited in note 1). 
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disagree with its commands.6 The authority of Supreme Court 
decisions interpreting the Constitution stands on the same 
ground: "[t]he reasons for having laws and a constitution that is 
treated as law are ... also reasons for establishing one inter-
preter's interpretation as authoritative."7 
I find this argument at least potentially persuasive. Settle-
ment, stability, and coordination are important goods that can 
only be had through a general practice of obedience to rules. 
They are not the only goods a society might pursue, and few 
would maintain that they are entitled to lexical priority. Moreo-
ver, obedience to decisions of the Supreme Court is certain to 
result in errors: sometimes the President or Congress will be 
right and the Court will be wrong. Yet if we expect that the 
benefits of obedience to Supreme Court decisions are greater 
than the harm obedience will cause through error, a rule of obe-
dience is justified. I am willing to assume, with Alexander and 
Schauer, that this is the case, even though the Court will make 
mistakes and may never correct them. 
The weak spot in Alexander's and Schauer's argument 
emerges when they come to Dred Scott.8 Having set out their 
case for a rule of obedience to Supreme Court decisions, they 
now anticipate an objection: surely Lincoln was right to threaten 
disobedience to parts of the Court's holding in Dred Scott. To 
avoid this difficulty, they explain that the obligation they have 
been defending is in fact only one "overrideable" reason that 
ought to play a part in official judgment. All things consid-
ered-including the obligation to obey-Lincoln was right to 
disobey the Court. Alexander and Schauer insist that this con-
cession does not undermine their argument: 
It just means that [the wrong of disobedience] was out-
weighed by the greater wrong that would have occurred had 
the war been lost. Once we see that overrideable obligations 
are still obligations, we need not say that Lincoln should have 
followed Dred Scott.9 
6. Id. On the capacity of laws that solve coordination problems to create reasons 
for action, see Gerald J. Postema, Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of 
Law, 11 J. Legal Stud. 165, 172-86 (1982); Donald H. Regan, Authority and Value: Re-
flections on Raz's Morality of Freedom, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 995, 1006-18, 1028-31 (1989); 
Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 49-50 (Oxford U. Press, 1986). 
7. Alexander and Schauer at 1377 (cited in note 1). 
8. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). See Alexander and 
Schauer at 1382-83 (cited in note 1). 
9. Alexander and Schauer at 1382. In a footnote, Alexander and Schauer men-
tion the possibility that a "Legal Realist" might be skeptical about the effectiveness of 
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Thus, the rule of obedience that Alexander and Schauer 
propose is not a serious rule- a rule to be followed in every case 
to which it applies. It is simply a consideration, of some unde-
termined weight, in favor of official obedience in most cases. 
For reasons I will explain, this apparently subtle distinction be-
tween a serious rule of obedience and a reason to obey intro-
duces a crucial qualification to Alexander's and Schauer's de-
fense of Cooper v. Aaron. From the perspective of personal 
morality, it is surely true that officials sometimes ought to diso-
bey a decision of the Supreme Court. 10 But from the systemic 
perspective Alexander and Schauer are taking, Cooper v. Aaron 
is of little value unless it means that Lincoln should have abided 
by Dred Scott. 
As Alexander and Schauer say, the justification for a rule of 
obedience to Supreme Court decisions lies in the benefits of 
authoritative settlement: stability, reliability, and coordination.11 
While these goods may sometimes be outweighed by other ends 
or values, it does not follow that the rule of official obedience 
should be something less than a serious rule. The problem, as 
Alexander and Schauer recognize, is that in judging the relative 
weight of settlement values and other goods, officials are likely 
to err; and if they err more often than not, a serious rule ensures 
the best results overall.12 
Settlement values are particularly vulnerable to several 
sorts of error. The first is a cognitive bias in favor of data that 
are specially salient and therefore readily "available" to the de-
cision-maker.13 For example, studies show that in assessing risks, 
people are strongly influenced by vivid accounts of particular 
events: the disasters we judge to be most frequent are those that 
receive the most dramatic coverage in the news. 14 This bias in 
presumptive or overrideable obligations, but maintain their own conviction that an over-
rideable obligation is capable of constraint. Id. at 1382-83 n.93. I intend to take up the 
skeptical position, though without endorsing the tenets of Legal Realism. 
10. On the irrationality of obedience to rules with which one disagrees, see Heidi 
M. Hurd, Challenging Authority, 100 Yale L.J. 1611, 1625-28 (1991). 
11. Serious rules, demanding obedience, are sometimes justified by the superior 
information or epistemic reliability of the rule-maker, but this is a difficult claim to 
make on behalf of the Supreme Court in relation to other branches of government. 
12 Alexander and Schauer at 1375 (cited in note 1) (discussing error). 
13. Cognitive biases in favor of available data are discussed in Amos Tversky and 
Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic For Judging Frequency and Probability in 
Daniel Kahneman, et al., eds., Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 163-
78 (Cambridge U. Press, 1982). 
14. See Paul Lovic, et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk in 
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases at 463,464-72 (cited in note 13). See 
also Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Evidential Impact of Base Rates in Judgment 
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favor of available information is likely to work against settle-
ment values when they compete with goods such as equality. Is-
sues of equality are salient because they refer to relatively con-
crete facts and are associated with the immediate fate of human 
beings. Settlement values, in contrast, are more remote and ab-
stract. Therefore, the demands of equality are likely to be more 
prominent in the decision-maker's calculations, while the need 
for settlement recedes. 
A second, related reason why settlement values may be un-
dervalued is a problem of coordination among officials. From 
the perspective of an official considering whether to obey a deci-
sion of the Supreme Court, a single instance of disobedience will 
not appear as a serious threat to the stability, reliability, and co-
ordinating effects of constitutional law as a whole.15 Settlement 
values, in other words, are cumulative values-values that make 
sense only in terms of their overall effect when pursued in a 
large number of cases. A value such as equality carries its full 
weight in each case in which it arises. Stability, on the other 
hand, is not important in any particular case, viewed apart from 
all other cases. This makes it easy for an official decision-maker 
facing a single decision to conclude that the effects of disobedi-
ence on stability are vanishingly small, while equality (or some 
other value) looms large. 
As long as errors of this kind occur, and as long as their 
cumulative effect is greater than the sum of errors that would 
follow from obedience, there is reason, from a systemic perspec-
tive, to insist that all officials must obey the decisions of the 
Court, in all cases. 16 Yet once Alexander and Schauer concede 
that Lincoln was not bound to obey the rulings of the Supreme 
Court, the rule of obedience is bound to unravel. Every official 
who concludes that settlement values are outweighed by other 
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases at 153-60 (cited in note 13) (specific informa-
tion favored over base rate information); Richard E. Nisbett, et al., Popular Induction: 
Information Is Not Necessarily Informative in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases at 101-16 (cited in note 13) (personalized information favored over general-
ized "consensus" information or abstract information). 
15. See Heidi M. Hurd, Justifiably Punishing the Justified, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 2203, 
2277-78 (1992) (discussing potential judicial errors in deciding whether to enforce legis-
lative rules). 
16. Alexander himself has made this point on several occasions. See Larry Alex-
ander, The Gap, 14 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 695 (1991); Larry Alexander and Emily 
Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1191, 1197-98 (1994). 
Schauer, too, has recognized the "asymmetry" between a governing authority and those 
it governs, which makes it rational for the authority to enact and enforce rules. Freder-
ick Schauer, Playing By the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-
Making in Law and in Life 130..33 (Oxford U. Press, 1991). 
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values in a given case will see himself as another Lincoln, and at 
least some of these officials will be wrong. If it turns out that 
the benefits of pluralist interpretation outweigh the loss of set-
tlement values, then we do not need a rule of obedience but only 
an occasional reminder that officials ought to bear in mind the 
benefits of authoritative settlement. But if the harm to settle-
ment values is likely to be greater over the run of cases than the 
errors that follow from obedience, the solution must be a serious 
rule, applicable even to Lincoln. Settlement values may in fact 
be morally tradeable against other values, but a rule designed to 
protect them against miscalculation in particular cases cannot 
admit that they are tradeable. 
At this point, Alexander and Schauer might respond that 
the rule of obedience need not be a serious rule as long as it has 
an appropriate dimension of weight. 17 Rather than a require-
ment of obedience in every case, there should be a presumption 
in favor of obedience, which can only be dispelled by a very 
strong competing good. In this way, Lincoln is excused; Dred 
Scott is ducked. 
Appealing as this suggestion may be, it simply will not work 
in a reliable way. Consider what the actual content of a rule of 
presumptive obedience might be. It might hold, for example, 
that officials must obey the Supreme Court's interpretations of 
the Constitution unless the harm to other values will be at least 
as great as the harm that disobedience will cause to settlement 
values. Or it might hold that officials contemplating disobedi-
ence must give settlement values at least three times their natu-
ral weight in deciding what to do. 
One difficulty with these solutions is that they leave it to 
the official decision-maker to determine the natural weight of 
settlement values. If the decision-maker gives little or no weight 
to goods such as stability, three times that weight is still negligi-
ble. If, as is more likely, decision-makers normally do recognize 
the importance of authoritative settlement, they nevertheless 
will vary considerably in their quantitative conclusions. Would-
17. Schauer has proposed a method of decision-making he calls "presumptive posi-
tivism," in which rules have a "strong but overrideable priority." Schauer, Playing By 
the Rules at 204 (cited in note 16); Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 
Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 645, 665-679 (1991). Ronald Dworkin has argued that law is 
made up not only of rules but also of legal "principles" that are not absolute but have a 
"dimension of weight." Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules I in Taking Rights Seri-
ously 14, 25-27 (Harvard U. Press, 1977). See also Stephen R. Perry, Judicial Obliga-
tion, Precedent and the Common Law, 7 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 215, 239-43 (discussing 
the weight to be given to judicial precedents). 
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be Lincolns will continue to err, and their errors may still exceed 
the errors associated with a serious rule of obedience. In any 
event, there will be no authoritative settlement of the question 
when to disobey. 
A further difficulty is that a weighted presumption is no less 
arbitrary from the decision-maker's point of view than a serious 
rule. It is not rational for a decision-maker to follow a serious 
rule when, after giving due consideration to the epistemic pedi-
gree of the rule and the settlement values that support a serious 
rule, the decision-maker disagrees with its result. But it is no 
more rational for the decision-maker to give settlement values 
three times their natural weight when, with due regard for the 
benefits of a threefold presumption, he disagrees with its re-
sults.18 In either case, nothing can make obedience rational ex-
cept a credible threat of sanctions against those who disobey. 
This raises a further question, whether sanctions could ever 
be applied to enforce a weighted presumption. A serious rule 
has the advantage of determinate application: there may be 
disagreement about the meaning of a Supreme Court decision, 
but once its meaning is ascertained, any disobedience is a viola-
tion of the rule. Determining whether a decision-maker de-
serves to be sanctioned for violation of a weighted presumption 
is a far more complex task. Whoever judges the decision-maker 
must first quantify the value of settlement and other goods in 
the context of the disputed decision and then decide whether the 
decision-maker's own valuations were culpably amiss. It follows 
that a weighted presumption is practically, if not conceptually, 
meaningless. 
Thus, if we assume, as Alexander and Schauer assume, that 
over the long run the sum of errors by officials, including their 
underestimation of settlement values, will exceed the errors 
brought about by obedience to decisions of the Court, then the 
best way to protect settlement values is to impose a serious rule 
of obedience on officials. Hard cases, including Lincoln's, must 
be included. Anything less leaves the Constitution less effective 
than it might be as a source of law. 
At the same time, the practical effect of a rule of obedience, 
however serious, is dependent on the sanctions that attach to 
disobedience. The fact that a serious rule of obedience may be 
18. Gerald Postema has made this point. Gerald J. Postema, Positivism, I Pre· 
sume? ... Comments on Schauer's "Rules and the Rule of Law", 14 Harv. J. L. & Pub. 
Pol. 797, 813·17 (1991). 
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justified from a systemic perspective does not make it rational 
for an official to obey when he believes it is right to disobey, all 
things considered. The only way to reconcile these two points of 
view is by imposing sanctions that alter the balance of reasons 
for action in the mind of the official. While a serious rule is 
much easier to enforce than a weighted presumption, sanctions 
against government officials for violating a rule of constitutional 
interpretation will always be far from perfect. There is no 
mechanism for punishment, and Bivens-like sanctions are lim-
ited.19 A clear statement by the Supreme Court that officials are 
bound to obey its decisions may increase political penalties for 
disobedience, simply because it marks alternative interpreta-
tions as direct challenges to the Court and the stability of consti-
tutional law. But the ultimate duty to obey will never be greater 
than the combined effect of formal and informal sanctions. To 
some extent, therefore, constitutional interpretation falls out-
side the reach of the rule of law. Lincoln must obey, but this 
does not ensure that he will obey. 
19. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents Federal Bur. Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
